On 9 September 1955, Jack Chambers, co-owner of Eva Downs Station in the Northern Territory, had an argument with his Aboriginal cook, Dolly Ross. That morning, Ross had refused to prepare breakfast for her fellow Aboriginal pastoral workers because she said she was ill. Chambers claimed that Dolly was malingering because she had quarrelled with her husband. After the argument, Dolly, her husband Jim and a minor named Munro left the station. Chambers claimed that he had ordered them off the property. The Ross family testified that they had left in protest when Chambers threatened to 'liven up' Dolly if she did not do her work. Later that morning, Jack Chambers, Colin Chambers, manager Jack Britt, and stockmen George Booth and Francis Booth rode out from the station either to muster cattle or to pursue the Ross family. Either motive was possible: there were cattle to be mustered and all hands were needed on deck.
Aboriginal workers. 8 Colin and Jack Chambers and the three stockmen were charged in the Tennant Creek Police Court on 17 October 1955, with 10 counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm to the victims. 9 The group (excluding Francis Booth, a minor) was then tried before Justice Kriewaldt without a jury from 12 to 15 December 1955. 10 Justice Kriewaldt found Britt to be 'reluctant and unwilling … perhaps little more than a spectator' and acquitted him of all 10 charges. George Booth was fined £25 for several counts of aiding and abetting their employers' assaults and his licence to employ Aboriginal people was revoked. However, Kriewaldt found Colin and Jack Chambers guilty on most counts, fined each a sum of £400, and jailed both for six months with hard labour.
11 He had never before convicted let alone jailed a white person for assaulting an Aborigine. 12 This article focuses on another, much less studied case stemming from the Eva Downs incident. In the months after the conviction, the Northern Territory Administration, under intense pressure from humanitarian groups and the federal government, brought a civil suit on behalf of Ross et al. against Colin and Jack Chambers. This litigation produced a little-known watershed decision by Justice Kriewaldt. He denied that the Crown could sue on behalf of the victims, reading down legislation defining Aboriginal people as wards of the state and strongly endorsing the legal standing of adult Aboriginal people before Australian courts. 13 This repudiation of state paternalism deeply troubled the administration. As a result, the Welfare Ordinance 1953 (NT) was amended to bolster the power of the state over Aboriginal wards.
14 In this paper, we explore new archival materials that minutely document this litigation, and through it, the practical and ideological dilemmas confronting Aboriginal welfare administration in the Northern Territory at this watershed moment. The civil case collapsed in the aftermath of Kriewaldt's decision. We show that it did so because of a combination of internal contradictions in the logic and practice of 1950s assimilation policy and practical difficulties arising from the distance and difference separating welfare officers from Aboriginal workers. 8 R v Sydney John Chambers, Colin James Chambers, Jack Britt and George David Booth (Unreported Judgment) [1955] NTSC No 55 of 1955, 291; Douglas 2005, 55-7. 9 See letter from J.C. Archer to The Secretary, Department of Territories, 29 December 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , unnumbered (59)-61. 10 Transcript of R v Chambers, NTWB 1955 /1154 , 35-59, 39. 11 The Age, 16 December 1955 Archer to Secretary, Department of Territories, 29 December 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 -61. The sum of £400 was a considerable financial burden (roughly equal to AU$10,500 today). 12 Douglas 2005 : 59. 13 Transcript of Judgment, Ross v Chambers, April 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 14 Correspondence makes clear that the 1957 amendments were drafted in response to Kriewaldt's judgment: Lambert to Archer, 13 June 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 . They took the form of s.4 of the Welfare Ordinance 1957 , No. 42, 1957 (Marginal note, Welfare Ordinance, 1953 -1960 .
The intellectual history of assimilation has been richly retold of late -Russell McGregor and Tim Rowse in particular have delivered nuanced expositions of deep commitment and deeper intellectual disagreements within the ranks of assimilationists about the value of preserving Aboriginal culture, and of the rich interface of government administrators with evolving humanitarian critiques. Rowse has recently pushed his analysis further -demonstrating the power of postwar bureaucratic thinking about population management and statistics to challenge countervailing discourses about Aboriginal culture and Indigenous rights.
This work engages deeply with the intellectual contributions of key policymakers -A.P. Elkin and Paul Hasluck. It is richly supplemented by the work of Alison Holland on Mary Bennett and Rani Kerin's on Charles Duguid, tracking their critiques and intersections with government policy. Our work builds most closely on a slightly different strand of this new historiography. It resembles John Murphy's very recent exploration of the pragmatic and principled discussions of government bureaucrats that underpinned the extension of welfare benefits to Aboriginal people after World War Two. 15 In this article, we use newly discovered interdepartmental correspondence to tell a hidden, bureaucratic and legal history of Aboriginal subjecthood in practice. The Ross litigation exposed deep fissures between the administration and the judiciary, and within the administration, about the nature of state power over Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory and the meaning of Aboriginal legal subjecthood, of assimilation and of the proper boundaries of protection in the aftermath of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A more nuanced understanding of 1950s policy lies somewhere in this minutely documented mess of principles and practice.
Assimilation and the Hasluck Administration
The Eva Downs incident occurred at a time of deep change in Aboriginal policy in the Northern Territory. Since the much-discussed national conference in 1937, Australian Aboriginal policy had shifted towards the notion that Aborigines were latent citizens and that Aboriginal citizenship was compromised by Aboriginal culture rather than Aboriginal race. This notion was only partly digested into legislation. After 1937, states around Australia had crafted policies aimed at incorporating 'half-caste' or mixed race Indigenous people into Australian society. 16 Though the Commonwealth Government lacked constitutional power to legislate Indigenous policy for the states until 1967, the Northern Territory Administration strove to lead the way by example. In 1939, J. McEwen declared a New Deal for Aborigines -promising a new administration, headed by a director and supported by anthropologically trained district and patrol officers distributed throughout the Territory, to protect Aboriginal labourers and educate and police Aboriginal people. 'Half-caste' children born out of wedlock would be taken into state custody and educated, chiefly, in useful trades. They and detribalised Aborigines would be educated into citizenship. Uncivilised and semi-tribalised Indigenous people required intergenerational assistance. They would be brought within the reach of government by patrols and trained, judged, imprisoned and/or cared for according to their needs on outback stations. 17 McEwen's plans were interrupted by the war. After the war, they were adapted and implemented by Hasluck -whose own thinking about assimilation was both transformative and eccentric.
18 As Elkin argued, Hasluck advocated 'a type of assimilation … [predicated on] the complete change of Aborigines in all but skin colour'. This was a vision that Elkin thought 'impossible' and 'demeaning' to Indigenous peoples and their cultures. 19 Hasluck's core contention was that the 'aboriginal problem … was a social problem and not a racial one'. McGregor and Rowse describe this as a species of 'liberal individualism'. 20 Membership of a political community, for Hasluck, was not 'contingent on religion, class or race'. It was contingent on affective membership: 'Not only must the majority absorb minorities, but the individuals from those minorities must relinquish their loyalties to any sub-groups of the nation.'
21 Government policies coercive of Aboriginal people, in this light, were: temporary measures, not based on race, but intended to meet their need for special care and assistance to protect them from any ill effects of sudden change and to assist them to make the transition from one stage to another in such a way as will be favourable to their social, economic and political advancement. Meanwhile, Aboriginal men and women in the Territory were increasingly active in defence of their civil rights. By the end of the war, 662 Aboriginal men and 73 Aboriginal women were employed by the army. 29 Aborigines enjoyed a much higher standard of living working for the army than they did on cattle stations. The army guaranteed £5 per week to labourers at a time when many workers were not paid cash wages at all on cattle stations. 30 Rations, clothing, accommodation and medical services were provided to dependants, as well as basic schooling for Aboriginal children. 31 According to Catherine and Ronald Berndt, prominent anthropologists who gathered first-hand data from various Northern Territory cattle stations from 1944 to 1946, employment in the army set a precedent below which it was unwise for pastoralists to fall.
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Most important, according to scholars and Indigenous informants, was Aboriginal experience of relative equality and respect in the army. Ann McGrath suggests that the army gave Aboriginal people 'that sense of being on the same standing, the same level as the whites. They saw that as equity, having tasted that'.
33 Alec Kruger, an Aboriginal soldier who fought in the war, stated that he had 'seen a bit of the world where I was treated with a bit of respect, and I wanted to recapture it'.
34 When both the Commonwealth and station owners demanded Aboriginal people return to their subservient, pre-war role, they could not erase the new expectations of Aboriginal labourers. Many were angered by 'the attitude of a staid group who wanted to subjugate, control and basically render people subservient again'.
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Working with communists, unionists and humanitarians, Aboriginal workers turned to activism in the postwar North.
36 So much is clear from the increase in Aboriginal workers 'walking-off' cattle stations. One of the more famous examples is the 1946-49 strike on several Pilbara cattle stations for higher wages. 37 Similarly, on Wave Hill Station in 1947, a patrol officer reported that four Aboriginal employees had left the station and had said 'they were just like white men and could leave the job when they felt like it'.
38 In September 1955, 29 Bunbury 2002; Powell 1982; Riseman 2012 . 30 Hall 1989 . It was only in 1947 that Regulation 14 of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (Cth) was repealed. This regulation had allowed pastoralists to avoid paying wages where they were able to prove that they were maintaining the employee's relatives and dependants: see Aboriginals Ordinance. 31 Powell 1982: 215-16; Saunders 1995: 114. 32 
Assimilation in practice
It is in this changing political and policy environment that the Eva Downs incident unfolded -and it exemplifies the awkward interface of the welfare and labour systems in a rapidly changing world. The incident was the result of Indigenous activism. According to Dawn May, Aboriginal pastoral workers could react to maltreatment in one of two ways -leaving the station or retaliating through physical force. 41 The Ross family, Dinny and Isaac used both strategies. The Ross family walked out in protest against verbal abuse and the threat of violence. Dinny and Isaac rode out to physically defend them. Eileen McDinny suggests that Isaac and her husband, Dinny, shared bonds of kinship with the Ross family, and that the 'Law' required Dinny and Isaac to 'try and save their uncle'. 42 All involved in the incident asserted rights as workers or band members that clearly surprised and unsettled the Chambers brothers.
At another level, the Eva Downs incident exemplifies the successful functioning of the postwar Welfare infrastructure. Scholars have noted the significant post-1937 innovation of appointing local Welfare patrol officers to oversee and supplement policing of Aboriginal workers and of their pastoral employers in the Territory. 43 But the Eva Downs incident shows much more than mere oversight. It shows local Welfare officials working closely with local policemen to defend the interests of Aboriginal workers. The Chambers brothers justified their violence first by making the explicit and powerful argument that they defended themselves against Aboriginal aggression and second by alleging that their Aboriginal workers were thieves. Police complicity in pastoral violence had a long history on Australian frontiers. 44 Instead of collaborating in white violence, however, the local policeman, R.F.H. Corbin, worked closely with the local Welfare Officer, Ted Evans, to corroborate the complaints of the Indigenous victims. Corbin independently suggested to the chief officer at Alice Springs police station that indictments would have to be heard at ' Alice Springs where a more competent Bench will be available'. 45 Indeed, his involvement in the 47 The alleged perpetrators, Sydney John Chambers (Jack), Colin James Chambers, Jack Britt and George David Booth were indicted on 17 October, and the acting Northern Territory Administrator had informed the minister of the case by 19 October. Legal officers in Darwin and Canberra wrote briefs and analysed law to facilitate litigation. All levels of administration were involved in plans to ensure that the case came before Kriewaldt and was tried by a Queen's Counsel. Hansard reporters were sent to transcribe, verbatim, the evidence of the plaintiffs (though, unfortunately, the transcript seems to have been misfiled or lost). 48 In short, every level of governance in the Territory and in Canberra joined the cause.
They did so in part to ward off mounting humanitarian critique. The Northern Territory became the particular focus of advocacy groups interested both in augmenting Commonwealth authority over Aboriginal affairs and in advocating for Aboriginal equality. Hasluck had been appointed Minister for the Territory in the fallout of the sensational arrest and 'banishment' of Fred Waters for leading Aboriginal workers in a strike in Darwin in 1951. 49 The Eva Downs incident caused a similar media furore. Shirley Andrews, secretary of the Melbourne-based Council of Aboriginal Rights, led the charge to bring the Eva Downs case to the attention of the public and to pressure the Northern Territory Administration into action. The Council of Aboriginal Rights saw the case as a 'wonderful opportunity' to bring the plight of Territory Aborigines to the attention of the public. To this end, they collaborated with the Melbourne Herald to make the case front page news. The paper published exchanges between Andrews and Hasluck. When the criminal case ended in conviction, Andrews trumpeted 'the beginning of a new era for the station Aborigines' that would 'give to others the courage to stand up against ill treatment'.
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All the while, she sent inquiries and suggestions to the offices of Hasluck. 46 R v Sydney John Chambers, Colin James Chambers, Jack Britt and George David Booth (Unreported Judgment) [1955 ] NTSC No 55 of 1955 , 299. 47 Telegrams, 26-28 September 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 2-5. 48 Archer to Lambert, 12 January 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 65. 49 Attwood 2003 : 131-36. 50 Attwood 2003 Correspondence within the Northern Territory Administration makes clear that its actions in both the criminal and civil cases were calculated to minimise humanitarian accusations that they were 'not treating the case with the seriousness it deserves'. At the insistence of the Crown Law Officer, the ministry retained senior counsel 'at all costs' -a path cast as 'good tactics on the part of the Commonwealth'.
51 'The point at issue', he noted, 'is that this case is likely to receive a great deal of publicity, irrespective of what the outcome is, and that publicity is bound to find its way overseas'.
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The Acting Administrator, J.C. Archer, asked for guidance from Canberra about how best to manage correspondence from the Association for the Protection of Native Races and the Council of Aboriginal Rights about the case -correspondence that included enquiries about whether the administration was providing assistance to the ' Aborigines when they are giving their evidence'; 53 pressure to bring a civil action against the Chambers brothers and Booth; criticism of the light criminal sentence handed down by Kriewaldt; and claims that the incident provided more evidence of the 'enormous gap between regulations as they exist on paper and the carrying out of them by the station owners' of the Northern Territory.
54 Ted Evans recalled in a memorandum to Giese that they had brought the civil action in part because of 'press reports wherein demands were made by certain Aboriginal Rights Societies that damages should be sought on behalf of the natives'. 55 Hasluck later reflected on what he felt was the unfair response of humanitarian interlocutors to the incident. In Shades of Darkness, an account of Aboriginal affairs between 1925 and 1965, Hasluck complained of the 'gross distortion' of the situation of Aboriginal people employed on cattle stations by several organisations who were 'active in spreading stories overseas to the discredit of Australia' to the London office of the Aborigines Protection Society, within United Nations circles and in several African countries. 56 He referred specifically to an incident (likely the one at Eva Downs) where an Aboriginal worker was struck with a stockwhip by a white cattleman. Though the cattleman was subsequently arrested, tried and sentenced, Hasluck lamented that: 51 Lambert to Hasluck, 26 October 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 14. 52 Lambert to Hasluck, 26 October 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 14. 53 Swan to Hasluck, 28 October 1955 Swann to Hasluck, 31 October 1955, 20; Unsigned (Canberra) to Admin Darwin undated, received 18 July 1956, 134; Lambert to Administrator of the Northern Territory, 29 May 1957, 186; Andrews to Hasluck, 24 February 1956 , 81-82. All in NTWB 1955 /1154 For requests for guidance see, Archer to Lambert, 16 November 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 ; and annotation on Archer to Lambert, 18 November 1955 , NTWB 1955 /1154 Evans to Giese, 13 January 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 71-72. 56 Hasluck 1988 This was not told as a story that it was against the law to strike an Aboriginal and that a strong penalty had been imposed on a white man for breaking the law. It was passed around as a story that black 'slaves' on Australian cattle stations were flogged when they displeased their slave-driving masters. 57 Hasluck's protestations notwithstanding, that story of violence had deep roots in fact; as Ann McGrath showed previously, violence, the threat of violence, and Aboriginal memories of violence had played a key role in the organisation of Aboriginal labour on cattle stations from the outset.
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In sum, the Eva Downs incident shows how genuine welfare reform combined with increasing public pressure pushed the Northern Territory Administration into frenetic action. The case provided an opportunity to model, not only for critics, but for the states, how Aboriginal welfare agencies might respond to protect as well as to infringe the civil rights of Aboriginal Australians. This goal was ultimately frustrated. Not only did the conviction of the Chambers brothers and Booth end in criticism and praise from the public, the civil case ended in ambivalence. Ross v Chambers forced the Welfare and Northern Territory administrations into the invidious position of pitting their desire to do justice and punish abusive pastoralists against Aboriginal legal subjecthood and the wishes of the Aboriginal victims.
The meaning of guardianship in a changing world
The case of Ross v Chambers made history without ever being fully resolved by a court. On 2 March 1956, the Crown Solicitor issued a writ against the Chambers brothers for more than £2,000 in damages (a sum claimed, according to the Associate Crown Law Officer, R.L. Odlum, on the very uncertain basis that Kriewaldt would treat the victims as 'white persons'). 59 He did so as 'next friend' of the Aboriginal victims and without their knowledge or consent. On 19 March, the Chambers brothers' solicitors applied: to set aside the issue and service of the writ on the grounds that (a) no authority of the next friend had been filed at or before the issue of the writ; and (b) Kriewaldt upheld both of these contentions. In a remarkable endorsement of Aboriginal legal subjecthood, Kriewaldt declared that, 'Prima facie, an aboriginal of full age living in this Territory is subject to the same laws and entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other person living in the Territory'. While the provisions of the Aboriginals Ordinance as amended gave Aboriginal Australians some special rights and removed others, it did not remove the standing of Indigenous adults before the courts. 61 Therefore, the Crown needed the permission of the Ross party in order to sue on their behalf. It is true that the interpretation of the section does present a good deal of difficulty but it seems to me that the interpretation which his Honour has given to it involves the reading into the section of qualifications and ideas that are nowhere expressed or even implied. I do not think that His Honour's decision is right.
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In this context, the Ross decision could be read as a product of policy as much as law -a robust endorsement of a basic tenet of legal assimilation. Kriewaldt contended, here and elsewhere, that Aboriginal inequality was transitory and did not alter their rights and obligations before courts of law.
67 His insistence that Aborigines should stand as equals before the law was very different, and much more antiquated, than Hasluck's vision. Legal incorporation underpinned metropolitan efforts to protect slaves and Aborigines throughout the British Empire in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. 68 Kriewaldt echoed sentiments expressed by Justice Burton of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the infamous Murrell case of 1836 that extended British jurisdiction over crimes between Aborigines on the grounds that Aboriginal customary law could not survive the advent of British sovereignty in the colony of New South Wales.
69 A few years after Ross, Kriewaldt would argue openly that law was a 'civilising medium' for Aboriginal people. 70 Law would encourage Aboriginal people to forego extrajudicial punishments, like payback. Instead they would accept punishments and protections administered by the state. According to Kriewaldt, if Aboriginal people were to be assimilated 'in the sense that they shall become a permanent, integrated, and useful section of the community' they must be punished for crimes they committed, as well as obtain justice for those crimes perpetrated upon them.
71 It was his opinion that 'all members of any given community are entitled to the benefits conferred by law, in return for which they become subject to the law and accept the restrictions laid down by the law'.
72 Those benefits, it is important to note, did not extend to full credibility in giving evidence, or to the right to be tried by a jury of peers.
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66 Withnall to Giese, 9 May 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 117. 67 Douglas 2005 . 68 Ford 2014 . 69 Ford 2010 Douglas and Finnane 2012: 37-41 74 However qualified, Kriewaldt's was not the assimilation imagined by the Northern Territory Administration. Indeed, the administration's reaction to his decision is much more revealing of the logic of assimilation in the middle of the twentieth century. At one level, that logic reflected very real concerns about the disadvantages faced by Aborigines as legal subjects. As Giese pointed out to the Chief Administrator in early 1956, Indigenous people might be severely disadvantaged by their status as equal civil litigants before the courts. Some of these disadvantages were the result of government policy. Most insidiously, as systematically underpaid workers, and as wards whose access to wages was controlled by the state, Aboriginal litigants in the Territory had limited resources to bring suits. Giese worried that the Chambers brothers might challenge their suit 'on the grounds that the Aborigines have no means of paying the cost of such action'. 75 Second, Kriewaldt's finding put litigation in jeopardy because it required the administration to involve the victims much more intimately in the civil case. This was physically very difficult. Though Territory Aborigines numbered among the most administered and surveilled people in Australia, the Northern Territory was a big place. Aborigines involved in the pastoral industry worked on remote stations and their combination of wage labour with traditional practices like walkabout made them mobile. As a result, they were often temporarily outside the reach of the state. This mattered when, in theory, the Eva Downs victims had just 14 days after the delivery of Kriewaldt's judgment to decide whether they would like to pursue the litigation in their own names. The process of finding the Ross party after Kriewaldt's decision took nearly three months! The decision was handed down on 5 April 1956. The Crown Law Officer forwarded permission forms to regional welfare officers on 10 May. 76 Evans sent a telegram to 'Manager Webb' at Borroloola on 23 May speculating that Dolly, Jim and Munro may have moved on to Seven Emus Station. 77 Two days later they were believed to be en route to Borroloola. 78 Constable Corbin was then enlisted in the effort to transport the party to the 'Brunette Occasion Race meeting to meet Patrol Officer Lovegrove'. 79 Lovegrove forwarded signed permissions from all of the Eva Downs victims on 26 June. 80 The Crown Law Officer, Withnall, did not hear of the permissions until 11 July. 81 Demonstrating the continued importance of public opinion to the case, the minister asked that news of the permissions be sent on to the Council of Aboriginal Rights just one week later. 82 The tight communication links between Hasluck and humanitarians contrast starkly with the enormous practical difficulties faced by Northern Territory administrators in bringing the Ross case back into court.
The other reaction of the administration to Kriewaldt's decision revealed the theoretical inconsistencies of assimilation policy. Administrators moved quickly to fill in the gaps in administrative control of adult Aborigines opened by Ross v Chambers. 83 Giese and the Crown Law Officer recommended immediate appeal to the High Court against Kriewaldt's decision. Withnall noted the danger the decision posed, not only to the welfare infrastructure established by the expiring Aboriginal Ordinance, but also to the new system established by the 1953 Welfare Ordinance. 84 Crown Solicitor, H.E. Renfree, disagreed. In May, he warned that an appeal might not be successful. Indeed, he agreed with Kriewaldt's finding:
whatever it does mean it [the phrase 'legal guardian'] cannot take away the legal right of aboriginals of full age and sane minds to conduct their own litigation. If that is not the Government's intention, I think the proper course is to amend the legislation to make it clear … 85 Amendment became the first priority of the Department of Territories within a fortnight. 86 Secretary Lambert asked the Welfare Office in Darwin to help. As Assistant Administrator Lawrie put it in late August:
The Director should be able to exercise all the rights and duties that are normally entrusted to a guardian in relation to an infant ward and if the Welfare Ordinance, as it now stands, does not permit him to do so it should be amended appropriately. 87 Lawrie noted that the new Ordinance already gave the Welfare Administrator most of the powers of guardianship at law, and recommended that it be explicitly expanded to include the power to bring suits as a 'next friend'. 88 But this raised a number of problems. At law, a guardian or next friend was personally liable for the costs of litigation. It also raised a problem when wards sued each other as the 'Director could not be next friend to both'. 89 Withnall had addressed these problems in a new draft amendment by 3 September. 90 This amendment, designed to undo the radical ramifications of the Chambers case, operated to constrain Aboriginal subjecthood from 1957 to 1964. It gave the Director of Welfare unambiguous power to bring suits on behalf of Aboriginal 'wards'.
All that remained, then, was to conclude the civil suit against the Chambers brothers to the satisfaction of the administration's humanitarian critics. This process exposed important tensions within the administration about the character of Aboriginal subjecthood and the responsibilities of the state for their welfare. In September, Newell and Ward, solicitors for the Chambers brothers, offered very modest financial settlements to the victims -a total of £220, onetenth of the damages claimed in the initial civil suit. Under this settlement, Jim Ross was offered £100, Dolly, £50, Isaacs, £50, Munro, £10 and McDinny, £10. Withnall refused to recommend this settlement to the Ross family. However, he recommended to Giese that the clients accept a more generous settlement of £520 (just over one-quarter of the original claim): £400 of this would go to the Ross family, £70 to Isaac Isaacs, and £25 each to Munro and McDinny. 91 Archer resisted, a strained mixture of condescension and wariness of public opinion underpinning his response. The Chief Administrator for the Territory pointed out:
Right throughout the whole of the proceedings relating to this assault case, our actions and advice have been guided by our acceptance of a responsibility to see that substantial justice was not only done; but that it also much appear to be done. 92 It was not clear that this settlement would achieve either. He complained that the amount of damages initially claimed and the settlement proposed by Withnall 'differs so widely that I most certainly do not feel competent to sit in judgment on the matter'. If the Crown Solicitor could demonstrate that the initial claim was 'excessively high' then he might be 'prepared to consider advising a settlement in the public interest'. But as 'the Crown Law Officer does not feel able to do that', Archer felt that his duty under the Ordinance required him to allow 'the matter to proceed to judgment in the court'. 93 Archer's discomfort was reflected in Withnall's more fulsome reply. Withnall confined his examination to the case of Munro who, as a minor, could be represented without his consent by the Director of Welfare despite Kriewaldt's decision in Ross. Withnall explained that the difficulty with the case lay in determining the nature of damage sufferable by an Aboriginal worker like Munro. Ordinary cases of assault determined special damages on the basis of expenses. But ascertaining the wages lost by an Aboriginal child worker was not easy, and, though none of the party was employed between September 1956 and January 1957, only one week's lost wages could fairly be attributed to their wounds. Munro could expect no more than £3 for a week's work if he was paid as an adult. Dolly and other Aboriginal women could only expect 10/-to £1 per week.
94 General damages assessed non-pecuniary losses -for example, the 'pain and suffering endured' by the victims. These might range from nothing (for the 'transitory' pain of a 'slap in the face') to £5,000 for serious injury. The perpetrators alleged that Munro was scarcely beaten, and the Crown Solicitor thought that £25 would suffice to cover his pain and suffering. 'Exemplary' or 'punitive' damages might further compensate Munro for the outrage and 'indignity' of being beaten. This head of damage rested on evidence of the victim's wounded pride. However, 'the circumstances of the assault, namely a deserted road far from the presence of others, and the social standing of the plaintiffs as labourers on a pastoral station, does nothing to increase the prospect of any large award under this head'. Withnall was careful to note that the 'mere fact that the plaintiff is an aboriginal is not relevant to reduce the amount of damages'. But he did concede that 'the facts of his occupation and standing in the community are to be taken into account'. 95 Munro's 'standing in the community' could hardly be read without reference to his Aboriginality defined as race or culture. Under the old and new welfare legislation, Munro could not command equal wages, could not control his own money and could be told where to live and with whom he could associate. Archer clearly sensed the danger here. He argued, again, that 'because of the principles involved the matter should take its course and be settled in and by the Court'.
96
Regardless of the administration's decision in the case of Munro, the Crown Law Officer noted that Giese was obliged to offer the terms of settlement to the adult victims. He advised moreover, that, under the Ross decision, Jim and Dolly Ross, Isaac Isaacs and Dinny McDinny would 'have to decide for themselves' whether to 'accept an out of court settlement' without 'persuasion of any kind by an officer of the Welfare Branch'. 97 Archer was troubled by the ramifications of this advice: 'surely we still have some general responsibility and some form 94 Referring to memorandum, Giese to Withnall, 5 March 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 80. 95 Withnall to Giese, 25 October 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 Annotation by Archer, 30 October 1956 , on Withnall to Giese, 25 October 1956 , NTWB 1955 /1154 , 152. 97 Archer to Lambert, undated draft (February 1957 99 When he finally tracked down most of the party at Borroloola in mid-March, Patrol Officer E.O. Harvey clearly felt it important to make some odd concessions to language difficulties. Each of the thumb-printed consent forms read 'Mr. Harvey bin explain to me that Chambers wants to pay me £[X] to finish that whipping business at Eva Downs Station. I understand properly and will take the £[X]'. 100 Importantly, when they signed these release forms the Ross family, McDinny and Isaacs declared that 'they would not want anything more to do with the case' of Munro. 101 It was now early 1957, more than a year after the criminal trial, and the adult victims were all eager to move on. Withnall agreed with them. He worried that the passage of time alone would make the victims bad witnesses in Munro's civil suit, and if they refused to give evidence, he thought the case could scarcely succeed in their absence. 102 Archer conceded that their reluctance might make it 'impossible for us to proceed with the case on behalf of Munro':
I am concerned that we have been forced into this position by Mr. Justice Kriewaldt's judgment and by the subsequent action of the four natives in accepting out of Court settlements, and I can appreciate that if and when it is known that a settlement out of Court has been agreed to by the natives, the Administration could come in for some criticism. However, I think we might find the position to be more damaging if we were to continue proceedings on behalf of Munro and then find in the absence of any evidence from the other natives that the decision went against us. 103 Archer wavered, however, when the post-Ross v Chambers amendment of the Welfare Ordinance came into effect. Section 24 gave him explicit power to act on behalf of all Aborigines declared to be wards under the 1953 Ordinance. This provision included all of the victims of the Eva Downs incident. He considered, again, whether he should force Ross and his kin into court both as litigants and witnesses. Withnall's response makes the tension between civil rights and protection very clear. He protested against the impropriety of dishonouring the agreements signed by the Rosses, McDinny and Isaacs in that brief period in which they were considered to be legal adults. He pointed out that the duty of the Commonwealth lay, not in the defence of its policy, but in defence of the 'particular welfare of the four persons in question'. Most importantly, he explained that pursuing the policy of the Commonwealth would require the forced relocation and testimony of the victims -a violation of their wishes and their interests.
[I]n light of the statements of the aboriginals as to their unwillingness to proceed you will, I am sure, realise that it is in the interests of the aboriginal plaintiffs to accept the offer which has been made and quite contrary to their interests to reject it. If the proceedings go on and it becomes obvious, as I feel sure that it must become obvious, that the aboriginals have been brought to Darwin against their wish, then I think quite proper and damaging criticism both from the Court and from the public may be directed at the Director of Welfare.
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Conclusion
This intricate story of shifting positions, practical difficulties, interdepartmental quarrels and public pressure demonstrates several important aspects of assimilation in practice in the 1950s. The case itself demonstrates the Northern Territory Administration's efforts to lead the states by example by holding employers accountable for the abuse of Aboriginal workers. It was also crafted in response to east coast humanitarian criticism: a sign of the sensitivity of government to United Nations scrutiny; and of its sense that Aboriginal rights were fast becoming an electoral issue in Australia. At the same time, by insisting on Aboriginal equality before the law, Kriewaldt's decision in the Ross case itself highlights the distance between assimilation policy and legal ideology at mid-century. Far from seeing the courts as a medium of Aboriginal civilisation, administrators saw them alternatively as a threat to Aboriginal subjects and as sites for the public performance of Aboriginal protection. Their desire to ward off criticism and to lead the nation was fatally hampered by Kriewaldt's formulation of Aboriginal legal subjecthood. If Aboriginal agency played a role in the incident at Eva Downs, then Aboriginal agency posed a deeper threat to the capacity of the administration to set a national standard for the protection of Aboriginal workers in the 1950s. In this logic, it is little wonder that the administration sought to close down Aboriginal agency by insisting that its Aboriginal wards were in the thrall of the state. The Eva Downs incident puts the ideological paradox of mid-century Aboriginal protection on full display.
